This study examined whether priming with social deception affects responses (pain estimates, selfreported sympathy, inclination to help) towards others' pain. We further explored whether the priming effect is mediated by the valence of the patients (positive/negative), as indicated by the participants. First, participants (N = 55) took part in an 'independent' delayed memory study in which they read either a neutral text about the use of the health care system (neutral condition) or a text about its misuse (social deception condition). Second, participants watched videos of pain patients performing pain-inducing activities. Participants rated the patients' pain, the sympathy felt for the patients, and the inclination to help the patients. Third, the participants re-estimated patients' pain when patients' self-report of pain was provided. Fourth, pictures of the patients were shown and participants indicated the valence of the patients (positive/negative). Results revealed no direct effect of priming with social deception. However, priming with social deception was related to less positive rating of the valence of the patients, that were related to lower ratings on pain and sympathy, and to larger discrepancies between the ratings of the patients and the observers. The results indicate that observers attribute less pain, feel less sympathy, and take patients' self-reported pain intensity less into account when the patients are evaluated less positively, which is likely to occur when a cognitive scheme of social deception is primed. Ó
Introduction
Pain is not only a private and subjective experience, it also has social or interpersonal features [13] . Understanding pain as an interpersonal experience requires consideration of its expressive nature and its effect upon others. Facing another in pain may elicit a variety of cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses in the observer [9-11,13,31] which may, in turn, affect the pain experience and well-being of the person in pain [5, 10, 13] .
Several factors come into play when an individual faces another person in pain. One factor is the belief in the genuineness of the pain displayed by the other. It is reasonable to assume that individuals are more inclined to help sufferers when they believe the pain to be real. However, when individuals suspect (social) cheating, helping may not be guaranteed. According to Cosmides [7] , individuals are particularly sensitive to cues to social cheating. Such sensitivity protects individuals from being exploited by others who challenge normal reciprocal altruism, or the social contract [17, 34] by taking a benefit without earning it. Estimating another person's pain may also be conceptualized as part of a social exchange situation. When a person expresses pain, the observer who has benefits to bestow (support or practical aid) has to decide whether to do so. Probably, the greater the observer's suspiciousness about the genuineness of the pain, the more cautious she or he will become in estimating the pain.
In line with this idea, observers attribute less pain to patients [17, 23] and underestimate pain to a larger degree [16] when they are explicitly told that some of the patients may fake pain. In everyday life and clinical practice, cues to cheating may be subtle and implicit rather than explicit. For example, reading an article in the newspaper about the misuse of the health care system may unobtrusively bias the reaction of an individual when she or he encounters someone experiencing pain. To date, there is no research on the effects of implicit priming with social cheating in pain.
The primary aim of the study was to investigate whether the effect of implicit priming with social deception lowers the observers' estimates of pain experienced by a patient, the sympathy for
